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Effectiveness, Equity, and Ethics of Costa Rica’s Payment for Environmental Services
Program
Anna Carter
Abstract: This paper examines the effectiveness of Costa Rica’s Payment for
Environmental Services, or PSA program, which provides government subsidies to
participants who protect forested lands or reforest their land. Effectiveness is determined
in terms of the program’s progress in reversing deforestation and generating reforestation
efforts, with particular attention paid to the success and failings of the program in
reaching small landowners. The claim that the PSA program can act as a tool for human
development is evaluated through its accessibility to small landowners. Finally, the
ethical costs and benefits of the market based scheme underlying the PSA program as a
process of commodifying nature is examined, looking to existing literature to determine
if market based solutions negatively or positively change the values small landowners
hold about the environment. This paper fills a unique gap in the existing research on
Costa Rica’s PSA program as it combines practical concerns about the effectiveness of an
environmental policy with questions of equity and ethics. Methodologies of policy
analysis, a sociological approach, and philosophical examination of the PSA program are
synthesized to conclude that the program is somewhat effective in curbing deforestation
and regenerating reforestation, institutional and financial barriers still restrict small
landowner access to the program, and ethical concerns about the nature of the program
have remained unrealized. Answering these questions supports the conclusion that the
PSA program should continue to be implemented, but understood as only one small part
of the fight in addressing the climate crisis.
Keywords: payment for environmental services, environmental ethics, access, Costa Rica
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Introduction

Comprising only .03% of the planet’s land mass, Costa Rica is home to 6% of the world’s
plant and animal species, situated in a unique biodiversity hotspot that makes the preservation of
its forests invaluable (Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007). Deforestation threatens the health of the
planet in a variety of ways, including loss of carbon sequestration, loss of oxygen production,
soil erosion, and loss of biodiversity (Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007). However, the benefits of
nature are not seen directly in the daily lives of landowners. When faced with preserving the
ecosystem of leaf cutter ants, or clearing one’s land to create a plantation that generates profit,
people are wont to choose the latter. Much like the rest of Latin America, Costa Rica suffered
from rampant deforestation from the 1960s through the 1980s, with land largely being cleared
for agriculture and cattle ranching use (Pagiola 2008). Because environmental services like
biodiversity, natural beauty, watershed protection, and greenhouse gas mitigation do not have a
price tag attached to them, they cannot compete in a capitalist market. Beginning in 1997, Costa
Rica’s Payment for Environmental Services program, or PSA program, was an innovative
approach to conservation that was intended to halt and reverse deforestation (Pagiola 2008).
Environmental services are defined as the multiple benefits humans accrue from the
function of ecosystems. Costa Rica’s PSA program identifies four of these services: greenhouse
gas mitigation, scenic beauty, hydrological services, and biodiversity (Pagiola 2008). These
services are not measured individually, but assumed to be a ‘bundle’ equally produced by each
hectare of land. Services like scenic beauty are particularly difficult to measure and assign a
price tag, so bundling preserves recognition of the benefit while still maintaining the viability of
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ecosystem services in a market based system. The PSA program is meant to address the market
failure of negative externalities, in which the cost of environmental degradation is not factored
into the final market cost of economic activities like creating a plantation, resort, or factory
(Silvertown 2015). If those costs are made explicit and payments are made to landowners whose
property provides environmental services, nature can then become competitive in the market.
Another touted benefit of payment for environmental services programs include the
capacity for human development, especially in poor and rural areas (Sanchez-Azofeifa et al.
2007). By financially rewarding landowners for preserving their trees or using their land to plant
new trees, the PSA program can act as a source of additional income without a major investment
required from participants. While the PSA program cannot replace participants’ primary source
of income, it acts as supplemental income which can improve the livelihood of small
landowners. By attaching financial compensation to certain land uses and practices, the PSA
program also has the potential to positively impact values concerning the environment held by
small landowners. To see direct financial benefits as a result of environmentally friendly land use
encourages landowners to be responsible in their interactions with ecosystems, and creates a
network of landowners with knowledge about sustainable land use that can be spread to
non-participants.
Having been implemented for 20 years, there is now a large body of literature available
on the successes and failings of Costa Rica’s PSA program. A diverse body of research on the
environmental, economic, and social impacts of the PSA program has developed, and similar
programs have been implemented in other nations throughout the world. Now that Costa Rica’s
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program has had two decades to develop, it is important to reflect on its impacts. This paper aims
to answer three questions:

1.) Has the PSA program been effective in reversing deforestation and generating
reforestation?
2.) Has the PSA program been equitable in terms of its accessibility to small
landowners?
3.) Has the PSA program impacted the values held by small landowners toward
nature?

This paper will fill a gap in the existing literature by synthesizing policy concerns of
effectiveness, sociological concerns of equity, and philosophical concerns of ethics to determine
whether the PSA program is a viable policy solution that can address the multi-faceted concerns
of environmental justice. Policy makers cannot be concerned purely with the effectiveness of a
program, but must also ask questions about for whom and how a program is beneficial.
Interdisciplinary research methods encourage a variety of viewpoints to be considered, and
prevent positivist approaches from clouding the understanding of the real human impacts that
occur when policy is implemented. A purely data driven approach to the PSA program would
ignore the social and ethical considerations of such a policy. While numerical data is valuable
and will be used as evidence in following sections, oral interviews conducted by several
researchers in the field, including Schwartz (2017), Lansing (2014), Schröter et al. (2018), and
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Ross (2016) with program participants and conceptual, philosophical arguments will also be
presented as equally valuable evidence to consider when forming a conclusion.
This paper will argue that Costa Rica’s PSA program is somewhat effective in terms of
its progress in reversing deforestation and generating reforestation efforts, though issues remain
in regards to additionality. Additionality is the measure of what practices would have remained
the same without the implementation of a policy, such as the downward trend in deforestation
rates already present in Costa Rica before the PSA program. Additionality is a confounding
factor that must be accounted for when attempting to determine the true impact of a policy on
individual and societal practices. While policymakers have worked to make the PSA program
equitable by enrolling more small landowners, many substantial institutional and financial
barriers remain. No conclusion can be given regarding if small landowners’ values have changed
due to the ethical ramifications of the PSA program, but I argue that the PSA program should
continue to be implemented as the conceptual ethical benefits outweigh the potential costs.

Background

The impetus of the PSA program in Costa Rica was the extreme deforestation that had
been ravaging the nation’s rainforests since the 1960s. Land was cleared primarily for
agricultural and cattle use, often resulting in monoculture plantations that continue to harm the
ecosystems around them and support little diversity of life (Arriagada et al. 2015). Large
corporations such as Del Monte and Dole have the financial capacity to buy out small
landowners, who may have otherwise used the land in more diverse and sustainable ways. Land
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was also cleared for timber, an issue that was addressed with the 1996 Forestry Law which
required the rational use of all natural resources and prohibited change in land cover of existing
forests, essentially prohibiting logging.
The PSA program coincided with the establishment of two other environmental laws
along with the 1996 Forestry Law, including the 1995 Environment Law which requires a
“balanced and ecologically driven environment for all” and the 1998 Biodiversity Law, which
requires the conservation and “rational use” of biodiversity resources (Sanchez-Azofeifa et al.
2007). These laws created the foundation from which the PSA program could provide payments
to landowners. By mandating a “balanced” environment and “rational use” of natural and
biodiversity resources, and by prohibiting the continued use of Costa Rica’s forests for timber,
these three laws helped create the proper institutional conditions for a program meant to
economically value environmental services. While a valuable policy, the 1996 Forestry Law in
particular represents a confounding effect when trying to research the effectiveness of the PSA
program in reversing deforestation, as deforestation itself was prohibited before the PSA
program was implemented. The issue of additionality, measuring what would have changed even
without the implementation of the PSA program, becomes relevant due to this prior prohibition.
Additionality will be discussed more in depth in the effectiveness section.
The administration of the PSA program falls to several different organizations. At the
national level, FONAFIFO, SINAC, and MINAE are the primary bureaucratic means of
implementing and monitoring the PSA program. FONAFIFO, the Fondo Nacional de
Financiamiento Forestal, was established under the 1996 Forestry Law as a public
forestry-financing agency. FONAFIFO is responsible for administering contracts and distributing
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payments to participants. SINAC, the Sistemas Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, and
MINAE, the Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, are responsible for inspection duties such as
land use monitoring and overall supervision of the program in forested areas (Sanchez-Azofeifa
et al. 2007). At the local level, NGOs such as the Community Blue Carbon Project act as
intermediaries between FONAFIFO and small landowners with little experience navigating the
bureaucratic process (Schröter et al. 2018). Civil society groups assist in spreading knowledge of
the PSA program and guide landowners who may have otherwise been left out of the program
due to unfamiliarity with the process or lack of initial funds.
At the international level, funding has been the primary way of participation. The PSA
program has received loans from the World Bank’s Ecomercado program, totaling $8 million to
support contract payments, which funded the program from 2001-2006 (Pagiola 2008). The PSA
program is also funded through a 3.5% fossil fuel tax, which totals around $10 million each year.
Hydropower producers also support the PSA program, providing contract payments to the
landowners who protect watershed basins and hydrological zones. These agreements began as
voluntary, but thanks to a water tariff established in 2008, a compulsory water conservation fee
is charged to water users, providing a more consistent and robust funding to FONAFIFO and
thus the PSA program (Pagiola 2008). Other local and international corporations participate as
fundors, but usually only provide payments to specified regions or farms that generate
environmental services that directly benefit that corporation (Schröter et al. 2018).
The PSA program originally offered three modalities at its inception. Forest conservation
was and remains the most popular modality. Forest conservation contracts require the
landowners to protect both primary and secondary forests that remained on their lands for 5
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years. In line with the 1995 Forestry Law, no land-cover change is allowed. Reforestation
contracts require landowners to plant trees on agricultural or otherwise abandoned land and
maintain those trees for 15 years (Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007). The final modality offered was
sustainable forest management, which has the same requirements as the reforestation contracts
but allows for landowners to conduct low-intensity logging while participating in reforestation
efforts on their land. In 2004, FONAFIFO introduced a new modality to the program intended to
target small landowners. The SAF, Sistemas Agroforestales, program requires that landowners
have active agricultural or cattle grazing areas on their land, and landowners are compensated for
each additional tree planted on their land (Cole 2010).
Payments vary based on modality and the amount of land enrolled in the contract. For
forest conservation contracts, participants receive equal installments of payments per hectare of
land for the entire 5 years. Contracts can be renewed after this 5 year period, though this is not a
requirement, and landowners are free to deforest their land after a contract has ended if they so
wish. For reforestation contracts, participants receive decreasing installments of payments per
hectare of land for the first 5 years. 50% is paid in the first year, 20% the second year, and 10%
the remaining three years. For sustainable forest management contracts, the same schedule of
payments is followed as reforestation contracts. In 2007, payments per hectare of land were
US$210 for forest conservation, $537 for reforestation, and $327 for sustainable forest
management (Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007). For SAF contracts, participants are paid per tree
planted, with the 2007 rate at $1.30 per tree. Participants must plant a minimum of 350 trees and
a maximum of 3500, and must maintain the trees for five years. Payments are received over the
first three years of the five year period, with 65% of the payment distributed in the first year,
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20% in the second year, and 15% in the third year (Cole 2010). In terms of livelihood impacts,
Costa Rican participants largely report using these funds for immediate needs such as clothing,
food, or school fees (Blundo-Canto et al. 2018). While cash sums are transferred to households
and sustainable land use practices are successfully implemented, there is no significant
improvement in the livelihood of households enrolled in the program (Arriagada et al. 2015,
Blundo-Canto et al. 2018). The program does not financially harm participants, but the income
supplied by the program is not consistent or large enough to meaningfully change the economic
situation of participants.

Effectiveness

Deforestation
While much of the literature concerned with the PSA program examines both cost
efficiency and effectiveness, I focus on effectiveness. Because there have not been continuous
studies on the whole of this program, but rather studies of specific geographic areas or certain
modalities of the program, it is difficult to gauge how effective the PSA program truly is, a
common issue when evaluating policy.
10% of Costa Rica’s total forest area is enrolled in the PSA program (Pagiola 2008). A
study conducted in Northern Costa Rica concludes that PSA participants kept 61% of their land
under forest cover, compared to 21% for non-participants (Zbinden and Lee 2005). Another
study in the Osa Peninsula reports that participants had 92% of their land under forest cover,
compared to 72% of non-participants. However, Pfaff et al. (2008) compared deforestation rates
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for PSA program participants and non-participants and found almost no impact of the program,
and that forest cover on those lands would have remained the same even without payments.
However, this land already had a low probability of suffering from deforestation. Morse et al.
(2009) examines the San Juan Biological Corridor and compares it with surrounding areas in
order to determine deforestation rates before and after the PSA program. This study finds that the
PSA program decreased deforestation in the corridor from 1.43% to .1%, and reports that 50% of
PSA program participants would have cleared forest from their lands without payments.
Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. (2007) found that national deforestation rates decreased under the PSA
program from .06% in 1986-1997 to .03% in 1997-2000.
This literature speaks to the difficulty of assessing the effectiveness of the PSA program.
There are several factors that limit the ability of researchers to understand the extent to which the
PSA program has decreased deforestionation in Costa Rica. The first is the confounding factor of
previous forestry laws. Because the Forestry Law of 1995 already prohibited the clearing of most
forest lands, 89.1% of the land enrolled in the PSA program would have been conserved even
without payments (Daniels et al. 2010). As Costa Rica implemented the PSA program in a policy
mix strategy, where several aggressive environmental protection laws were put into place in a
short amount of time, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of those previous laws from the
effects of the PSA program (Pagiola 2008).
Previous forestry laws lead to another difficulty in addressing the impact of the PSA
program, additionality. Additionality requires one to imagine a counterfactual scenario in which
a PSA participant would not be enrolled in the program, and what they would then do with their
land. The PSA program operates on the assumption that if there is a more profitable option than
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leaving the forest intact, landowners will clear their land. Calculating additionality is difficult, as
researchers do not necessarily have access to PSA program participants to determine their
counterfactuals with certainty, and must estimate additionality based on local market trends and
the current profitability of other land uses. There is no consistent method used to evaluate
additionality throughout the literature on the PSA program. Pfaff et al. (2008) use statistical
pairing of PSA program and non-PSA program farms based on biophysical traits and
accessibility to determine comparable land use. Morse et al. (2009) compared deforestation rates
before and after the PSA program in a biological corridor, which is a targeted or high priority
area, compared to non-targeted areas, and considered the next best land use as gathered from
farm-level survey data. Sierra and Russman (2006) determined additionality by observing
non-PSA farm’s land use in the same region. Because there is no standardized method of
calculating additionality, it can be a struggle to determine the impact of PSA payments on land
use decisions. In Daniels et al.’s (2010) analysis of the reliability of the previous four studies’
methods of calculating additionality, Morse et al.’s (2009) region specific analysis of before and
after deforestation rates was found to be the most reliable, whereas Sanchez-Azofeifa et al.’s
(2007) method of comparing before and after national deforestation rates was found to be the
least reliable. Both Sierra and Russman (2005) and Pfaff et al. (2008) used methods found to be
moderately reliable, using regional or farm specific data rather than national data. These results
suggest that additionality can most reliably be measured by identifying regional specific factors
and counterfactual situations, which is consistent with the variable results produced by studies
measuring the effectiveness of the policy on reversing deforestation. Landowners do not exist as
a monolithic group across Costa Rica, and local factors impact their land use decisions. In short,
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while creating counterfactual situations is not and should not be an exact science, narrowing the
scope of the data and factors considered when measuring additionality will increase the
reliability of a researcher’s method.
Another issue which arises from the design of the PSA program is the lack of targeting of
high priority lands, such as biological corridors. The PSA program is a voluntary program, in
which participants self-select. As a result, low priority lands that are at a low risk of
deforestation, or are already legally barred from deforestation, can be enrolled in the program.
Because the PSA program receives more applications than it can accept, and has no method of
filtering low priority lands from high priority lands, this could be negatively impacting the
effectiveness of the program (Pagiola 2008). However, Pagiola has also suggested that the PSA
program was offered as a quid pro quo for the prohibition of clearing forests, reducing resistance
to the initial legislation that is likely responsible for the total decline of deforestation.
Another confounding factor emerging from the voluntary nature of the program is
institutional path dependence. Daniels et al. (2010) explains that landowners who participated in
pre-PSA forest conservation initiatives were over represented in the early cohorts of PSA
participants. This speaks to the power of information accessibility and familiarity with the
bureaucratic functions of FONAFIFO. Because these pre-PSA participants had already worked
with forestry officials and understood the process of enrolling and institutionalizing their land,
they made up two-thirds of the participants interviewed of the 1998-1999 cohort. In comparison,
60% of the non-PSA landowners in the same geographical region had zero familiarity with the
program. Sierra and Russman (2006) further support this claim, noting that early
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PSA-participants had more familiarity with the program requirements and individuals monitoring
land use.
In terms of decreasing deforestation, the majority of the literature available supports the
conclusion that the program has had little to no impact. On the deforestation front, the program
was not effective. However, this does not mean that the PSA program has had zero impact on the
environmental health of Costa Rica, but rather speaks to the aggressive policy mix the country
implemented just a few short years before the PSA program began. Because there was a ban on
forest clearing prior to the PSA program, it follows that the program itself is not the sole impetus
for deforestation decline. Deforestation remains extremely low in Costa Rica, and several studies
suggest that the true benefit of the PSA program may be its impact on reforestation, which will
be explored in the next section.

Reforestation
The PSA program may struggle to reduce already low deforestation rates, but a benefit of
the program is changes in land use, such as agricultural abandonment and natural forest
regeneration that prior to PSA would have been cleared (Daniels et al. 2010). By changing the
land use patterns of PSA participants under the forest conservation modality, the PSA program is
able to generate even more new forest growth, beyond the capacity of reforestation and SAF
contracts alone. Sierra and Russman (2006) conclude that PSA participants with forest
conservation contracts are more likely to abandon agricultural land use when PSA funds are used
to further economic activities besides agriculture, allowing for new forest growth. However, they
do caution that this forest regrowth is not covered under forest conservation contracts, thus gains
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may not be permanent as landowners could clear their land of this new growth without violating
their contract. They also caution that limitations from fundors like the World Bank require PSA
funds to go to secondary or primary growth forested lands, not areas where the land has already
been cleared or degraded. This represents a barrier to expanding the PSA program to non-forest
areas that could benefit from the program.
Moreover, there is a gap in research on the success of reforestation contracts. Presumably
this is due to the assumption that as long as participants in this modality comply with the terms
of their contract, reforestation would be successful. Unlike forest conservation contracts, there is
less concern about additionality or confounding factors when considering reforestation contracts,
as participants would be unlikely to undertake the labor intensive activities required under this
contract unless they were receiving some sort of compensation. Those who choose to participate
in the PSA program under the reforestation modality face barriers of high start up costs. The
establishment costs of a plantation are particularly high during the first four years, due to
management activities (Montagnini and Finney 2010). By providing 50% of the payment in the
first year of reforestation activities, the PSA program does attempt to cover part of this initial
cost and reduce the burden on landowners. The additional benefit of natural forest regeneration
from land conservation contracts is obviously slower and less intentional than reforestation
contracts, as the regenerated forest is not receiving the same level of management and care as
provided by the reforestation modality. However, due to the sheer number of forest conservation
contracts under the PSA program, this additional forest growth is a significant side effect. The
payments for forest conservation contracts were larger than both reforestation and forest
management contracts combined at the beginning of the program (Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007).
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Another more recent revision of the PSA program is the SAF modality. The SAF
modality allows farmers to continue to use their land for farming, called agroforestry systems,
and for cattle ranching, called agrosilvopastoral systems, while planting trees. These systems
prevent land degradation, which is marked by soil erosion, loss of biodiversity, contamination of
water sources, and decreased agricultural productivity (Montagnini and Finney 2010). Cattle
ranching and aggressive farming lead to land degradation, which inhibits forest regrowth when
that land is abandoned from further use. By paying farmers per tree planted, the PSA program is
not only able to generate reforestation, but it also protects biodiversity in agricultural lands, and
improves the nutrient cycling in soil. SAF contracts force farmers to abandon monoculture
plantations, in which one agricultural product is intensively farmed, degrading the land and
preventing any survival of native plant or animal species from thriving. Montagnini and Finney
report that farms participating in SAF modalities have the same levels of species richness as
secondary growth forests. The accessibility of the SAF modality to small landowners will be
discussed later in this paper.

Equity

Participation Patterns
One of the supposed benefits of payments for environmental services programs is their
ability to address environmental concerns while improving human development through
supplemental income. While improving the livelihood of small landowners was not the top
priority when Costa Rica was developing its PSA program, it is meant to be one of the
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advantages of these schemes in general. The question then becomes whether PSA participation is
accessible to this population in the first place. Without knowledge of the program and the skills
to navigate the administrative aspects of PSA, these benefits of positive human development will
remain unrealized.
Zbinden and Lee (2005) found that large landowners were disproportionately represented
in the program compared to small landowners. In addition, PSA participants were more likely to
be better educated, more urban-dwelling, more reliant on non-agricultural sources of income, and
have higher agricultural incomes than non-participants. Zbinden and Lee identify three major
influences in participation for the PSA program, which include farm size, human capital, and
information. Those with larger farms serve to benefit more financially from the program than
small landowners, as they face similar start up costs yet receive larger payments because of their
land size. Human capital includes years of education and non-agricultural management skills,
both of which are usually greater in large landowners because of their relative wealth to small
landowners. The ability to understand and perform the administrative tasks required of the PSA
program puts larger and more wealthy landowners at an advantage. Information is crucial for this
imbalance, as Zbinden and Lee found that 61% of non-participants were unfamiliar with even the
basics of the PSA program. Small landowners are less likely to come into personal contact with
intermediary forestry officials responsible for delivering administrative tasks to participants and
provide information about the program. These intermediary roles are considered essential in
making the program more accessible to small landowners, and some community organizations
have formed to fill this information gap.
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Lansing (2017) expresses a similar sentiment as Zbinden and Lee, noting that access to
forestry programs requires engaging with state institutions that are unfamiliar to small
landowners, whereas large landowners are likely to have more experience with these institutions
and thus have more successful interactions. Lansing also found that even among small
landowners, wealthy households out-participated medium and poor households, with wealthy
households comprising 31.5% of participants, medium households 16.9%, and poor households
at 15%. Of small landowner participants, the predictors for enrollment were older households
with primarily non-agricultural income and labor. This is similar to Zbinden and Lee’s
conclusion about large landowners’ income ratio. Lansing suggests that wealthy small
landowners are only part-time farmers, with their income coming from professional salaries, a
similarity with large landowners. Lansing notes that the older household factor of small
landowner participants is not held common with Zbinden and Lee’s work on larger landowners,
but is a feature unique to small landowners. Older heads of house are more likely to enroll in the
PSA program as a sort of retirement plan.

Multi-Institutional Property Barriers
There are several significant barriers in place that prevent small landowners from
participating in the PSA program. Lansing (2014) identifies the most significant being the
demands of property regularization, disjointed state institutions, and historical patterns of rural
settlement. Despite intentional efforts by the state to revise the program and make it more “poor
friendly,” the PSA program continues to enroll significantly more large and wealthy landowners
than small and poor landowners (Lansing 2017). As discussed above, a small landowner does not
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necessarily correlate as a poor landowner, but even wealthy and small landowners are
underrepresented compared to large landowners. From 1997-2008, 39% of PSA funds went to
corporately owned lands, with only 1% going to small landowners who own state agrarian
reform lands (the Costa Rican acronym IDA will be used from here out to refer to state agrarian
reform lands) (Lansing 2014). The legibility of land ownership and lack of proper documentation
is the primary barrier IDA farmers face when attempting to gain access to the PSA program.
Land title regularization began in 2001 and is an ongoing process. Costa Rica has two different
agencies responsible for recognizing the boundaries of one’s land and the official owner of one’s
land. The Land Property Registry records the titles of purchased land, while the Cadastral
Nacional stores the official cadastral surveys which mark the boundaries of one’s land. Because
two separate institutions are responsible for land regularization, there are often discrepancies
between the title and cadastral surveys, leading to property disputes and illegible claims of
ownership. The 2001 reform of land title regularization was meant to resolve these discrepancies.
Unfortunately, regularization and legibility of land ownership is further complicated by
ambiguous land claims. Land squatting under Costa Rican law is a valid claim to property
ownership if one has been residing there for ten years. While no longer common, this was a
method by which poor peasants could obtain property. While squatters would obtain the land
title, they often would not have a cadastral survey conducted. And if a cadastral survey was
performed, there are still discrepancies between the official land title and the official survey. It is
costly and requires familiarity with state institutions to fix inconsistencies in land titles and the
cadastral surveys, preventing those who obtained their land through squatting from participating
in the program. Lansing notes in an interview with an NGO worker responsible for increasing
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small landowner participation, the status of the land title and the cadastral survey is one of the
first screening questions asked. Unfortunately for small landowners, the cost of making their
land claims legible outweighs the financial gains of the PSA program. Once there are financial
barriers to the application process, many small landowners are unable to apply.
IDA land causes even more problems for property regularization. IDA lands are
settlements with basic infrastructure where tracts of land are distributed to the poor, who can
then pay off the land over a fifteen year period. During that fifteen year period, the land is still
owned by the IDA. The purpose of IDA land is to be developed for agricultural use so that
residents have a steady source of income. This is directly in conflict with the goal of the PSA
program, which is to reduce agricultural land use and encourage reforestation. Thus, until 2003
IDA landowners were not legally permitted to enroll in the PSA program. In 2003, the IDA
agreed that landowners could participate in the PSA program, but only if their land payments
were up to date. Lansing identifies this payment clause as the primary barrier to IDA landowner
enrollment, as it is more than common for IDA landowners to fall behind on payment or illicitly
rent their land to others. The IDA debt clause is a major reason that IDA landowners make up
only 1% of the PSA contracts, punishing the poor for their own socio-economic status and
restricting small landowner participation in the program.

SAF Modality
One method by which the state has attempted to remedy the exclusion of small
landowners is the introduction of agroforestry and silvopastoral systems. The SAF modality was
developed with the goal of targeting small landowners in low socioeconomic regions, including
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regions with high concentrations of indigenous people (Cole 2010). By allowing landowners to
use their land for agricultural and cattle purposes, often the primary source of income for small
landowners, the SAF modality offers an opportunity for previously excluded groups to
participate in the PSA program. This is significant concerning participation patterns of small
landowners, as the majority are wealthy and make most of their income from non-agricultural,
professional activities (Lansing 2017). By targeting low socio-economic regions and requiring
that participants use their land for agricultural or cattle purposes, the SAF modality can attract a
larger portion of poor landowners, instead of wealthy landowners.
Another question concerning the SAF modality is how much it benefits small
landowners. Receiving US$1.30 for each tree planted, with a minimum of 350 trees, the sum of
the payments is not very large. Cole (2010) reports that 78% of SAF participants said that their
income level had increased, and that payments exceeded the planting expenses, particularly in
indigenous communities dependent upon subsistence farming. Payments were used for farm
improvements or for immediate needs like clothing or school fees. Cole also notes indirect
socioeconomic benefits of the SAF modality, as a farmers’ association in Biolley used the tree
planting as a way to recruit volunteers and ecotourists to their region. As discussed previously,
one of the essential factors that can make or break the success of the SAF modality are
intermediary actors. Community level organizations such as human development NGOs and
farmers’ associations played crucial roles in communicating program requirements, facilitating
workshops with forestry officials, and providing technical support for farmers. Access to
institutional mechanisms remains a barrier, as landowners who entered SAF contracts
independently reported difficulty understanding contract requirements and interacting with
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forestry officials. The establishment of community organizations that can facilitate interactions
with FONAFIFO, SINAC, MINAE, and the forestry officials is vital to making modalities like
SAF successful in reaching their target populations.

Ethics

Intrinsic Values, Exploitation, and Commodification
In addition to judging the effectiveness and equity of the PSA program, ethical questions
must be considered. Environmental services as a concept creates a transactional relationship
between humans and nature, in which people profit off the environment and define what parts of
the environment are considered valuable to humans. The next three sections of this paper will be
dedicated to examining the issues that arise from a neoliberal understanding of environmental
services, how institutionalizing these programs creates a paradigm that resists deconstruction,
and examining the actual and potential impacts on human-nature relationships of small
landowner PSA participants. Before examining these factors, I will provide an outline of
common ethical critiques and advantages of environmental services.
Schröter et al. (2014) consider several common critiques and counter-arguments
surrounding the concept of environmental services. Note that these critiques are not specific to
Costa Rica’s PSA program, but are applied to the concept of environmental services themselves.
I will use the term PSA program to refer to Costa Rica’s specific program, and PES schemes to
refer to the general practice of payments for environmental services. The first of such critiques is
the anthropocentric nature of environmental services. Environmental services are identified only
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as they are beneficial to humans. Costa Rica’s PSA program specifically identifies four bundled
services: greenhouse gas mitigation, scenic beauty, hydrological services, and biodiversity. By
picking and choosing elements of the environment advantageous for humans, PES schemes
exclude the intrinsic value of nature. Even if climate change precipitates a major human
extinction, the environment will continue to change and regulate itself. There is reason to argue
that the environment should be valued as a thing in and of itself, regardless of its relationship to
humans. This is a biocentric form of reasoning in which nature has intrinsic value, rather than an
anthropocentric form of reasoning in which nature has only instrumental values as related to
humans. A counter-argument is that anthropocentric reasoning is not mutually exclusive to
biocentric reasoning. Humans can recognize the intrinsic value of nature while recognizing the
instrumental values through which we benefit. This anthropocentric reasoning is not necessarily
negative, but rather a method through which arguments for the sustainable use of the
environment can be made more legible in decision-making.
Another critique of the ES concept is that it forms an exploitative relationship between
humans and nature. Casting the environment as a producer of services casts humans as
consumers of the environment, rather than an integrated part of the environment. Nature’s
position as a product further alienates humans from engaging with the intrinsic value of the
environment. If this becomes the primary way in which humans imagine the environment, it can
damage our interactions with nature due to the exploitative mindset. This transactional and
profit-driven view of nature is already present in the fossil fuel industry, logging industry, and
many other corporate entities which depend on natural resources to both produce and profit. PES
schemes run a particular danger because this mindset would be extended to everyday workers,
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further complicating the ability of the world to respond to climate change. A counter-argument to
this is that environmental services can actually serve as a conduit through which humans can
reconnect with nature. This could be especially influential in the Western world, where
modernization has led people to become increasingly removed from the environment. By
identifying specific and often intangible services that the environment provides, such as scenic
beauty, PES schemes posit financial value that can be understood by modern consumers.
Without a specific price tag conferring a tangible value on these intangible services, consumers
may ignore the necessary benefits of nature and continue to create negative externalities of
environmental degradation. Instead of alienating humans from nature, PES schemes could force
us to acknowledge the true value the environment holds for human well-being.
The final critique is the economic valuation of environmental services. This is essentially
a ‘slippery slope’ argument, in which the economic valuation of some select environmental
services, like greenhouse gas mitigation, could lead to the economic valuation of things like the
sun, ocean currents, or gravity. This critique argues against the commodification of previously
non-marketed areas. Formerly organic relations between humans and nature become commercial
relationships through PES schemes. A classic Marxist critique of commodification is offered by
Gomez-Baggethun and Perez (2011), in which capitalist modes of production recast previously
complex social relationships into transactional exchange relationships between objects.
Commodification resulting from economic valuation mystifies and obscures environmental
services, reducing ecological complexity and the many biotic and abiotic factors that generate
environmental services to a transactional market-based system. A counter-argument to this
critique is that economic valuation of environmental services does not mean that these services
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are not valued for non-economic reasons, but rather provides a way of assigning value that can
be used in economic and political decision-making to protect the environment. Environmental
services are limited and scarce resources, unlike the sun, ocean currents, or gravity. The
commodification of nature to make the value of its services legible under current economic and
political conditions does not mean that commodification is the only relationship humans can
cultivate with nature.

PES Schemes and Neoliberalism
PES schemes often come under fire from critics as neoliberal policies that create
transactional relationships, commodify nature, and require the privatization and regulation of
ecosystem functions and property rights. Lansing (2014) argues that while PES schemes often
function as state subsidies rather than market-mediated sales, the necessity of property
regularization and privatization causes many of the same negative outcomes as neoliberal
policies. Land regularization leads to the exclusion of some groups and ignores cultural or local
practices of land use or ownership. As described previously, Costa Rica runs into problems with
the exclusion of IDA landowners and land squatters, who lack the funds to make their land
ownership claims legible under the requirements of the PSA program and other governmental
institutions. Rather than locating the problem in the PSA program itself, Lansing concludes that
it is the interaction between multiple state institutions that leads to the exclusion of some
landowners.
While Lansing separates PES schemes from neoliberalism as state subsidies, others have
critiqued PES schemes specifically for their emergence under a neoliberal framework.
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Silvertown (2015) defines neoliberalism as “the philosophy that seeks the deregulation of
markets and the privatization of all possible goods and services” (643). Silvertown goes on to
claim that nature is actually devalued by monetization, and casts the decision to monetize nature
as a moral choice rather than an economic imperative. This is a direct contestation of Constanza
et al.’s (2014) claim that humans no longer have a choice under current economic and political
conditions to not use monetary valuation for conservation efforts. Silvertown argues that the
claim that monetization of ES is the only option left to protect biodiversity and other
environmental services has not been systematically tested, but continues to be supported because
the issue is framed in a way which prevents other options from being considered. The paradigm
surrounding environmental services presents the issue in such a way that valuation of nature for
its intrinsic benefits is seen as insufficient to justify protection, which falsely assumes that people
only care about something if it has a market-value. Not only is this a cynical mindset from which
to view people, it is also a narrow mindset that ignores the many counterexamples through which
people and institutions have acted collectively without financial incentive to protect global
commons. An example of this capability is the Montreal Protocol, in which world governments
were able to cooperate to prevent environmental and human harm from the depleted ozone layer.
Despite resistance from the chlorofluorocarbon industry due to market losses they would suffer
in the transition from CFCs to HCFCs, people and institutions were able to recognize the many
non-monetary benefits of an intact ozone layer.

PES Paradigms
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Following the criticism of PES schemes as agents of neoliberalism, there is more to be
said concerning the “paradigms” of ES, and how it can create ignorance. As PES schemes
become adopted by more and more nations, the collective understanding of how to address
conservation concerns becomes more limited. Institutions such as the United Nations form
organizations like REDD+ which facilitate PES schemes globally, further cementing PES
schemes as the solution for mitigating the externalities of environmental services. Muradian et al.
(2013) note the fatal attraction of “win-win” solutions, or policies that address environmental
concerns and human development. These researchers illuminate the parallels between the
dissemination of PES schemes with the dissemination of “integrated conservation and
development projects (ICDPs)” which gained popularity after the Rio Summit on Sustainable
Development (Muradian et al. 2013). Revisiting the success of these projects a decade later, it
was found that ICDPs had made little progress in promoting conservation or human
development. When attractive “win-win” policies are presented to policy makers with the
resources to quickly implement them, unintended consequences are unaccounted for, and
alternate options can be rejected in the face of the current policy paradigm. The simplicity of
PES schemes is alluring, yet also illusory, as policies that refuse to take local context into
account can fail. This can be seen in Costa Rica’s PSA program by their failure to account for
IDA landowners, thus creating a policy which excludes the demographic, rural and poor
landowners, that the human development side of the program is meant to target.
Establishing PES schemes as the dominant framework to address ecological conservation
can also have the consequence of devaluing local knowledge. Institutionally driven policies can
strip local and indigenous people of environmental practices that may have been successful and
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sustainable, replacing them with financially driven, neoliberal practices. Lohmann (2008)
discusses the “production of ignorance” that often accompanies development projects, such as
market construction, rural income programs, and surveying and mapping. The solution presented
by PES schemes becomes epistemically privileged in the minds of institutional actors, as the
truth of the knowledge of PES schemes is validated by organizations like the United Nations and
REDD+. Knowledge and solutions produced by local people is then at an epistemic
disadvantage, as that knowledge fails to be validated by these same institutions. If locally
developed solutions are brushed aside for the sake of a paradigm that does not necessarily have
the evidence to support its claims, institutions can create patterns of ignorance. Ignorance of the
mechanisms of climate change, now simplified by the appeal of “win-win” solutions, falsely
constructs a narrative in which communities are unable to find solutions for sustainable living
without turning to financial incentives. The dominance of these solutions suppresses local
engagement with the climate crisis and creates a sense of complacency in which people trust that
the solutions considered the most attractive are the solutions that are the most effective and
equitable.
The epistemic privileging of knowledge produced through institutional solutions such as
PES schemes can be mitigated by the involvement of civil society organizations. Serving as
intermediaries between local communities, fundors, and governmental administrations like
FONAFIFO and MINAE, civil society organizations can balance the power dynamic between
local communities and institutions. Schröter et al. (2018) examine the impact of the Community
Blue Carbon Project (CBCP) in Costa Rica, which worked with local fishermen to protect
mangrove areas. Companies that benefited from the services provided by the mangroves were the
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fundors in this case. By establishing networks of trust between leaders in the CBCP, local
fishermen, and representatives of the company, this organization was able to head off the issue of
epistemic privilege. Fishermen familiar with the ecology of the mangrove areas were able to
contribute their local knowledge, and were in turn more trusting of an outside expert on
mangrove conservation provided by the CBCP. Organizations focused on both social and
environmental justice working with local communities is one method by which PES schemes can
avoid entrenching themselves as a paradigm that resists deconstruction and obscures alternate
sources of knowledge. By retaining awareness of the power and knowledge imbalances that
policies like PES schemes can create, steps can be taken to prevent this negative consequence.

Ethical Impacts on Small Landowners
The final philosophical consideration is the impact the PSA program has on small
landowners’ engagement and relationship with the environment. Unfortunately, there is little
literature which addresses the question of PSA programs participants before-and-after attitudes.
Despite this gap in research, there is some evidence available which begins to sketch a picture of
the potential ethical impacts of the PSA program. A potential positive impact on small
landowners’ attitude toward nature is the tangible value placed on ‘undesirable’ land. Land not
fit for agricultural or cattle purposes is undesirable because it is not profitable, but the SAF
modality allows landowners to profit by planting trees there. This can encourage landowners to
value nature for the indirect benefits of environmental services, along with the direct benefits
that stem from agricultural or cattle use. The accelerated agricultural land abandonment resulting
from forest conservation contract participants could also be a positive ethical impact of the PSA
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program, as landowners abandon traditional views about natural regrowth as encroaching on
their property and instead embrace regrowth for its positive environmental impacts. Participants
in the PSA program also have the capacity of gaining new knowledge about the benefits of
sustainable land use which can then be diffused locally to non-participants, strengthening
community knowledge to live sustainably.
Another possibility is that participation in the PSA program may not impact participants’
values at all, but rather enable people to engage in activities that align with already held values.
Ross (2016), Schwartz (2017), Arriagada et al. (2015), and Cole (2010) conducted interviews
with small landowner participants in different PSA modalities, and all found non-financial,
environmental motives for participation. A barrier to sustainable land use is poverty, in which
basic needs for survival must be prioritized over sustainable practices. Heads of households must
make decisions about whether to leave forest on their land intact and receive no profit, or clear
that land and receive funds that could provide food, clothing, or schooling to their family. The
PSA program could be a way for small landowners to enact values they already hold, and
improve their knowledge of how to live sustainability without undue cost.
One would be remiss to assume that the PSA program would have solely positive
impacts. General critiques of the PSA program and PES schemes overall include the
transactional relationship it establishes between humans and nature. This only furthers the
commodification of land and nature that small landowners are already exposed to due to their
socioeconomic position. The environment becomes a product that one can and must use in order
to survive. The intrinsic value of nature can be lost when programs like PSA assign monetary
value, resulting in a mindset of exploitation directed toward the environment. This negative
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impact has the potential of distancing people from the lifestyle changes necessary to address the
climate crisis. If nature is only useful as far as it benefits an individual directly, it could become
difficult to justify to landowners why they should not use slash and burn agricultural techniques
on land that isn’t enrolled in the program.

Conclusion

There are a variety of challenges facing the effectiveness, equity, and ethics of Costa
Rica’s PSA program. Rather than remain static and allow these problems to ferment, actions
have been taken at local and national levels, as civil society organizations work to correct local
issues and new modalities of the program, such as SAF, are introduced. Like many
environmental and social programs, there are barriers that can only be discovered after the
implementation of the program, such as the illegibility of traditional means of property
ownership. By synthesizing literature addressing policy, sociological, and philosophical concerns
that arise from the PSA program, this paper has highlighted shortcomings of the program and
research gaps concerning its impact.
Though measures of effectiveness show limited impacts on reducing deforestation, the
benefits from encouraging reforestation, teaching and diffusing responsible land use methods,
and breaking traditions of slash and burn agriculture make the program worthwhile to continue.
This assessment is further supported by the conclusions drawn concerning equity and ethics.
While small landowners remain at a disadvantage in terms of access to the program, national and
community institutions are aware of this disparity and have made efforts to change. Ultimately, it
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is the interaction of many different institutions which restricts small landowner access to the
program, a barrier which can only be addressed by continued efforts to make all government
institutions more accessible to the public. Farmers’ associations, civil society organizations, and
forestry officials must build social networks within local communities which support the
knowledge necessary for small landowners to successfully interact with unfamiliar institutions.
There are many potential ethical concerns that originate from the concept of environmental
services, but those concerns have largely been unrealized in Costa Rica’s case, and as with
equity concerns, can be mitigated through strong social networks created at a local level. Oral
interviews consistently support non-financial motivations behind participants’ decisions to enroll
in the program (Schwartz 2017, Ross 2010, Lansing 2014), suggesting that participants do not
fall victim to the concerns of commodification and nor lose sight of the intrinsic values of nature
for instrumental ones.
Further research is needed in the social areas of Costa Rica’s PSA program. Little
research exists in which the the attitude and values of Costa Rican landowners are considered, a
subject which is often discounted in policy considerations. Examining the motivations of
participants before and after enrolling in the program, and any changes in values they hold
toward nature could demonstrate the benefits of the PSA program and provide justifications to
continue the program unrelated to financial or environmental concerns. Further research on the
livelihood impacts of the PSA program for small landowners compared to large landowners is
also necessary. There is still limited research which examines how PSA income impacts the daily
functioning of small landowners, and whether there are even greater wealth disparities created
because of large landowners improved access to PSA funds.
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While PES schemes have been adopted on an international scale, they are less common in
developed nations, due to their characterization as a human development project. I argue PES
schemes could find success on a state-level and a local-level scale in the United States. I
recommend state and local-level ventures because of the issues in measuring effectiveness and
the confounding factor of additionality present in Costa Rica’s program. For example, the
Florida state legislature could enact a PES scheme in order to protect ecologically valued but
financially devalued wetlands. Wetlands are inhabitable by humans and are often degraded for
real estate or development projects. By explicitly monetizing the services wetlands provide,
Florida could more efficiently and effectively deter wetland degradation than by the command
and control approach that is currently implemented (Texas A&M AgriLife Extension 2007).
A final note of caution considering the widespread acceptance of PES schemes is related
to Lohmann’s (2008) concern about establishing paradigms of thoughts in regard to addressing
the climate crisis. PES schemes are not and should not be the only solutions considered when
attempting to protect ecologically valuable lands. Instead, PES schemes should be thought of as
one piece of the puzzle in addressing climate change and environmental degradation. The
institutional acceptance of PES schemes is not a negative, but the popularity of this solution and
focus on changing individuals’ practices must not obscure the corporate forces that are
responsible for mass deforestation and land degradation. Corporate entities such as Dole and Del
Monte generate much more profit through ecologically destructive monoculture plantations than
any PES scheme could provide them, and PES schemes are not a solution for the problems
created by late stage capitalism. PES schemes work as voluntary, market based programs that
integrate cleanly into already existing capitalist structures. These non-radical solutions are an
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important step in the fight against the climate crisis, but in the face of globalized corporate
forces, voluntary solutions can only be a small part of the picture. Collective solutions such as
the Paris Accords must come to be accepted by governments along with strong enforcement
methods in order to do the work humanity needs to address the climate crisis.

34

References
Arriagada R., E. Sills, P. Ferraro, S. Pattanayak. 2015. “Do Payments Pay Off? Evidence from
Participation in Costa Rica’s PES Program.” Plos One 10, no. 7 (July): 1-17.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0131544
Blundo-Canto, Genowefa,Vincent Bax, Marcela Quintero, Giselle Cruz-Garcia, Rolf
Groeneveld, Lisset, Perez-Marulanda. 2018. “The Different Dimensions of Livelihood
Impacts of Payments for Environmental Services (PES) Schemes: A Systematic Review.”
Ecological Economics 149 (July): 160-183.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.03.011
Cole, Rebecca. 2010. “Social and Environmental Impacts of Payments for Environmental
Services for Agroforestry On Small Scale Farms in Southern Costa Rica.” International
Journal of Sustainable Development 17, no. 3 (May): 208-216.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13504501003729085
Costanza, Robert, Ralph d'Arge, Rudolf de Groot, Stephen Farber, Monica Grasso, Bruce
Hannon, Karin Limburg, et al. 1997. “The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and
Natural Capital.” Nature 387, (1997): 253-260. https://doi.org/10.1038/387253a0
Daniels, Amy, Kenneth Bagstad, Valerie Esposito, Azur Moulaert, Carlos Rodriguez. 2010.
“Understanding the Impacts of Costa Rica’s PES: Are We Asking the Right Questions?”
Ecological Economics 69, no. 11 (September): 2116-2126.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.06.011
Gomez-Baggethun, Erik, Manuel Ruiz Perez. 2011. “Economic Valuation and the
Commodification of Ecosystem Services.” Progress in Physical Geography 35, no. 5
(October): 1-16. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0309133311421708
Lansing, David. 2017. “Understanding Smallholder Participation in Payments for Ecosystem
Services: the Case of Costa Rica.” Human Ecology 45, no. 1 (February): 77-87.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10745-016-9886-x
Lansing, David. 2014.“Unequal Access to Payments for Ecosystem Services: The Case of Costa
Rica.” Development and Change 4 5, no. 6 (October): 1310-1331.
https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12134
Lohmann, Larry. 2008. “Carbon Trading, Climate Justice, and the Production of Ignorance: Ten
Examples” Development 51, no. 3 (September): 359-365.
https://doi.org/10.1057/dev.2008.27
Montagnini, Florencia, Christopher Finney. 2011. “Payments for Environmental Services in
Latin America as a Tool for Restoration and Rural Development.” AMBIO 40, no. 3

35

(May): 285-297. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-010-0114-4
Morse, W., J. Schedlbauer, S. Sesnie, B. Finegan, C. Harvey, S. Hollenhorst, K. Kavanagh, D.
Stoian, J. Wulfhorst. 2009. “Consequences of Environmental Service Payments for Forest
Retention and Recruitment in a Costa Rican Biological Corridor.” Ecological Society 14,
no. 1 (June): https://dio.org/10.5751/ES-02688-140123
Muradian, R., M. Arsel, L. Pellegrini, F. Adaman, B. Aguilar, B. Agarwal, E. Corbera, et al.
2013. “Payments for Ecosystem Services and the Fatal Attraction of Win-win Solutions.”
Conservation Letters 6, no. 4 (November): 274-279.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-263X.2012.00309.x
Pagiola, Stefano. 2008. “Payments for Ecological Services in Costa Rica.” Ecological
Economics 65, no. 4 (May): 712-724. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.07.033
Pfaff, Alexander, Juan Robalino, Arturo Sanchez-Azofeifa. 2008. “Payments for Environmental
Services: Empirical Analysis for Costa Rica.” Working Paper Series of the Terry Sanford
Institute of Public Policy. http://sanford.duke.edu/research/papers/SAN08-05.pdf.
Ross, Cody. 2016. “Sliding-scale Environmental Service Payments and Non-financial Incentives:
Results of a Survey of Land-owner Interest in Costa Rica.” Ecological Economics 130
(October): 252-262. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.07.014
Sanchez-Azofeifa, G. Arturo, Alexander Pfaff, Juan Robalino, Judson Boomhower. 2007. “Costa
Rica’s Payment for Environmental Services Program: Intention, Implementation, and
Impact.” Conservation Biology 21, no. 5 (July): 1165-1173.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1523-1739.2007.00751.x
Schröter, Barbara, Bettina Matzdorf, Isabel Hackenberg, Jennifer Hauck. 2018. “More than just
linking the nodes: civil society actors as intermediaries in the design and implementation
of payments for ecosystem services - the case of a blue carbon project in Costa Rica.”
Local Environment 2 3, no. 6 (2018): 635-651.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13549839.2018.1460808
Schröter, Matthias, Emma van der Zanden, Alexander van Oudenhoden, Roy Remme, Hector
Serna-Chavez, Rudolf de Groot, Paul Opdam. 2014. “Ecosystem Services as a Contested
Concept: A Synthesis of Critique and Counter Arguments.” Conservation Letters 7, no. 6
(January): 514-523. https://doi.org/10.1111/conl.12091
Schwartz, Gregory. 2017. “The Role of Women in Payment for Environmental Services
Programs in Osa, Costa Rica.” Gender, Place & Culture 24, no. 6, (June): 890-910,
https://doi.org/10.1080/0966369X.2017.1342603

36

Sierra, Rodrigo, Eric Russman. 2006. “On the Efficiency of Environmental Service Payments: A
Forest Conservation Assessment in the Osa Peninsula, Costa Rica.” Ecological
Economics 59, no. 1 (August): 131-141. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2005.10.010
Silvertown, Johnathan. 2015. “Have Ecosystem Services Been Oversold?” Trends in Ecology
and Evolution 30, no. 11 (November): 641-648.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tree.2015.08.007
Texas A&M AgriLife Extension. 2007. “Florida State Law for Wetland Protection.” Accessed
February 10, 2020.
https://coastalresilience.tamu.edu/home/wetland-protection/policy-framework/state-law/fl
orida-state-law-for-wetland-protection/
Zbinden, Simon, David Lee. 2005. “Paying for Environmental Services: An Analysis of
Participation in Costa Rica's PSA Program.” World Development 33, no. 2 (February):
255–272. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2004.07.012

37

